



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVY INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS OFFICE
1111 JEFFERSON DAVIS HIGHWAY
CRYSTAL GATEWAY NORTH, SUITE 701 E.
ARLINGTON, VA 22202-1111

4920

Ser 09SP/8U020 167

SEP 04 1998

From: Director, Navy International Programs Office

Subj: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY STRATEGIC PLAN FOR
INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS 1999 - 2003

Ref: (a) Director, Navy IPO ltr 4920 Ser 09SP/8U020025 of 10 June 98
(b) Director, Navy IPO ltr 4920 Ser 02D/8U020005 of 20 Jan 98

Encl: (1) Department of the Navy Strategic Plan for International Programs 1999 - 2003

1. Enclosure (1) is hereby promulgated.

2. This Strategic Plan makes a vital link between national security and military policy guidance and the Department of the Navy's international programs. The sections of our Strategic Plan are tailored to each Unified CINC's Area of Responsibility goals and objectives. We have incorporated the CINC's individual Theater Engagement Plans, aligning our goals with those of the warfighters. The final section of this plan links International programs business plans to the prioritized goals identified by our senior national and military leadership. The business plan for platforms, systems and services was initially provided as an enclosure to reference (b) and subsequently revised as recommended by the CINC's. We believe this element of the Strategic Plan for DON International Programs is essential for solid future planning and resource allocation in today's environment.

3. Navy IPO points of contact for strategic planning are Mr. George Bernstein, IPO-09SP, (703) 604-0235, FAX (703) 604-0722, DSN 664-0235, E-mail: bernstein.george@ipo.hq.navy.mil and Mr. Robert E. Morrison, (703) 604-4984, DSN 664-4984, E-mail: morrison.bob@ipo.hq.navy.mil.


R. SUTTON

Distribution:

Joint Staff (J-517). Washington DC

DSAA

HQ, USACOM (DCINC, J5)

USCENTCOM, CCJ4/7-SA, CCJ5, CMD GROUP, Washington Liaison Office

USEUCOM, ECJ4, ECJ5, Washington Liaison Office

USCINCPAC, J4, Washington Liaison Office

USSOUTHCOM, SCJ5-SA, Washington Liaison Office

CINCLANTFLT (N3, N5)

Subj: NAVY INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS OFFICE (**IPO**) STRATEGIC PLAN

CINCPACFLT (N3, N5)

CINCUSNAVEUR (N5)

COMUSNAVCENT (N5)

U.S. Department of State (Office of Arms Transfer and Export Control Policy)

U.S. Department of Commerce (Office of Strategic **Industries** and Economic Security)

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Strategy and Threat Reduction)

ASSTSECNAV (**RD&A**), Washington DC

OPA Washington, DC

CNO (N00K, **N3/5**, **N1**, N7, N4, N8)

CMC (**PP&O**, POS)

CDR MARCORPSYSCOM (**PSS**)

COMNAVAIRSYSCOM (1.4)

COMSPAWARSYSCOM (**SPAWAR-05F5**)

COMNAVSEASYSYSCOM (PMS-380)

NETSAFA (N-00)

NAVICP-OF

CNET Pensacola, FL

Blind copy to: (w/o encls)

Navy (IPO-COS, 09X, OOL, 01, 11, 12, 02, 260, 270, 280, 03, 04, 05)

**Department of the Navy
Strategic Plan
for
International Programs
1999-2003**

Navy International Programs Office

**September
1998**

**Department of the Navy Strategic Plan for
International Prop-ams. 1999-2003**

Table of Contents

Figures and Tables.....	iv
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.....	v
STRATEGIC PLANNING AS AN EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS.....	1
Following Our Vision.....	3
The Theater Commanders-in-Chief and the Sea Services..	7
REQUIREMENTS OF THE THEATER COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF:	9
USCENTCOM	9
USCENTCOM's Theater Strategy.....	9
Theater Strategic Goals and Navy International Programs in USCENTCOM.....	10
USEUCOM.....	15
Strategic Elements.....	16
Theater Objectives and Navy International Programs in USEUCOM.....	17
USPACOM	23
USPACOM's Theater Strategy.....	23
Strategic Objectives for Navy International Programs in USPACOM.....	24
USSOUTHCOM.....	31
USSOUTHCOM's Theater Strategy.....	32
Strategic Objectives for Navy International Programs in USSOUTHCOM.....	33
COMMUNICATION, COORDINATION, AND PLANNING	39
BUSINESS PLANNING.....	41
Aviation New Sales Business Plan..	41
Aviation EDA Business Plan..	45
New Construction Ships Business Plan..	47
Ship Transfer Business Plan. Business Plan..	51
Marine Corps New Business Plan..	55
C4I/Electronic Warfare Systems Business Plan.....	57
Ship Launched/Fired Ammunition Business Plan.....	59

Figures and Tables

Figure 1: The Strategic Planning Process	1
Figure 2: Navy International Programs Statement Vision.....	4
Table 1. USCENTCOM Theater Strategic Goals and Navy IPO.....	9
Table 2. USEUCOM Theater Objectives and Navy IPO..	17
Table 3. USPACOM Strategic Objectives and Navy IPO.....	24
Table 4. USSOUTHCOM Strategic Objectives and Navy IPO	33

Department of the Navy Strategic Plan for International Programs, 1999-2003

Executive Summary

The Navy's International Programs Community acknowledges the unique challenges of the 21st century for the United States, its military, friends and allies. This plan is intended to establish an active and vital link between national security policy and those entrusted with carrying it out, in this multifaceted arena. A coherent and viable strategy needs to match the requirements of the theater Commanders-in-Chiefs (CINCs) with the Department of the Navy's (DON) business and product planning programs, while supporting the needs of our sea services — the U.S. Coast Guard as well as our Navy-Marine Corps team.

This process takes a “top down” and a “bottom- up” approach. “Top down” represents a strategic level of broad policy and objectives, defined in response to the international security environment. The strategy evolves, via the steps Vision, Assessment and Strategic Plan, to result in international program goals and objectives as articulated by the theater CINCs and the Sea Services. The Navy International Programs Office, and the broad range of organizations that make up the Navy's International Programs Community, accomplish these goals via Objectives and Macro-Strategies.

“Bottom up” deals with the specific elements of equipment, platforms, cooperative programs and training, which make up, in a manner of speaking, the tactical level of our relations with other countries. The CINCs' develop system, platform, and services requirements; identifying product, country and quantity. Program Planning will synthesize the CINC's requirements, plan initiatives, and evaluate likely successes. The next steps are Program-Specific Road Maps, leading to International Programs “Business Plans,” to further expand and develop the product plans. Implementation Thrusts help assess priorities. These steps help establish a complete database, the result of aligning strategic and tactical concerns; creating the basis of our strategic business plan.

This plan is the logical successor to *International Programs: Enhancing Global Security*, in which the Secretary of the Navy outlined his vision for the next century, and Navy IPO's *1997 Strategic Assessment*, which defined the geopolitical and economic environment in which international programs must operate. This strategic plan, once published, is not an end in itself. As our efforts continue, we will improve the process to expand its applicability and value; providing direction and cohesion to our efforts. This plan contributes to meeting the security assistance needs of our international partners, within the context United States security policy, and in support of the maritime services and **warfighting** Commanders-in-Chief.

Strategic Planning As An Evolutionary Process

The Department of the Navy's International Programs Community — a diverse spectrum of DOD, other government agency and industry players, including Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard leadership and staffs, systems commands and acquisition professionals — acknowledges the challenges of the 21st century for the United States, its military, and its allies. Rapid technological advances, evolving threats and a shifting geopolitical and economic environment demand planning that can anticipate requirements and adapt to change. This is a varied community, one that may include Security Assistance Offices (SAOs) in the field to the Departments of State and Commerce to defense companies large and small, all with perhaps a correctly competing point of view. Planning effective in a time of great change is a challenge. To meet this challenge, the Navy International Programs Community should strive to ensure continuous linkages between its programs, national policy, and the requirements of the theater Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs), while supporting the Sea Services' needs during an era of constrained resources.

We are setting in motion a process to establish the needed linkages — a process that will serve the entire community — enabling us to better coordinate our actions, reach our goals, and streamline the current procedures we use to reach those goals. It is our hope that all contributors to Navy International Programs will benefit from this process. The basic process is shown in **Figure 1**. There are two major segments in the process — a “Strategic” Level, and a “Tactical” Level.




Figure 1. The Strategic Planning Process

The Strategic Level consists of three components, moving from the Vision as enunciated in national policy, through a Strategic Assessment of the international

environment in which our Programs operate, to this Strategic Plan, which describes the goals and objectives set by the theater CINCs and the Sea Services. The Department of the Navy's (DON) international programs has the role to accomplish those goals and objectives, as well as the macro-strategies or sub-strategies by which the Navy International Programs Office proposes to support them.


The Vision is derived from national-level documents such as the National Security Strategy, the National Military Strategy, as well as U.S. Arms Trade Policy. The Strategic Assessment builds on their guidance, and uses the strategies of the theater CINCs in building a description of the international environment within each area of responsibility. The core of the Strategic Plan specifically addresses the goals and objectives of the theater CINCs and the Sea Services, and the "fit" of Navy International Programs into those goals and objectives thus far. The Strategic Plan also incorporates elements of the report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, *Joint Vision 2010*, The Assistant Secretary of the Navy's (ASN[RD&A]) *Strategic Plan 1998-2003*, and other pertinent documents.

The Appendices of the Strategic Plan are "Country Surveys," organized by CINC Area of Responsibility (AOR). These surveys are snapshots of the country discussed. Of course a comprehensive, all-encompassing country studies would be dynamic and diverse -too complex for inclusion in this plan. Therefore, these surveys serve as departure points or background for the broader audience. They attempt to include the critical area at which the Tactical Level of the Plan and the Strategic Level, link -the **Macro-Strategies**. The building blocks of the Strategic Plan, the Macro-Strategies, are sub-strategies or elements of strategy that map a path to meet specific theater, regional or capability goals. The Macro-Strategies, drawn from the CINCs' Strategic Concepts, are the final component of the Strategic Level and reflect and focus the strategic objectives for Navy International Programs' business planning process.

Beginning at the bottom of our model, the Tactical Level of the Strategic Planning Process begins with a "Program Planning" phase for programs viewed as potential International Programs Initiatives (**Figure 1**). The Navy International Program Office (IPO), Systems Commands and industry program planners project sales of platforms, systems, and services, and evaluate the proposed initiatives' probability of success. The proposed Initiatives are forwarded to the next tactical phase during which "Program Specific Road Maps" are designed.

The Program Specific Road Maps phase adds the elements of enabling support, required to implement each of the Initiatives. Timelines are drawn up to put the support in motion. The support required includes not only industry's marketing initiatives, such as participation in expositions, visits with foreign **officials**, and so forth, but also such elements as the training, maintenance, logistics, and transport necessary to make the initiative successful, and the administrative and legal processes such as Technology Transfer and Security Assistance Review Board (TTSARB), National Disclosure Policy Exceptions, and Congressional approval.

At the third phase of the Tactical Level, the “Business Planning” phase, costs are projected and assigned to the Initiatives forwarded from the Program Specific Road Maps phase. Business Plans are established to ensure their accomplishment. During the final phase of the Tactical Level, the Implementation Thrusts, priorities are assigned to the Initiatives, and assessments made regarding their probabilities of success, as well as final validation given to ensure Initiatives coincide with the Strategic Objectives and Macro-Strategies of the CINCs.



Following Our Vision

Navy International Programs' Vision Statement has evolved from the initial vision articulated by Secretary Dalton in the *1997 International Programs: Enhancing Global Security*. This Vision Statement (**Figure 2**) helps bring focus to the broad missions and goals of the Navy's International Programs Community. The complexity of the tasks before us and the range of participants involved in accomplishing those tasks require that we clearly understand those goals and missions. Our Vision will help keep the focus, and assist us in making the difficult judgments on the directions our programs must take and evaluating the validity of our assessments as circumstances change.

Derived from our Assessment

Navy International Programs' Strategic Assessment reflects the national and international context within which our efforts must function. That context, far from being static, is constantly shifting — a kaleidoscope of events, players, and requirements to which our programs must adapt. Within that context, the Navy International Programs Strategic Plan will evolve with the shifting realities of a complex future.

An ongoing reevaluation of our international programs will examine whether each continues to serve the national policies of the United States and the needs of the theater Commanders-in-Chief and the Sea Services. Our National Security Strategy' is designed to advance our goal of a safer, more prosperous America. Derived from the National Security Strategy, the National Military Strategy' identifies the following tasks for the American defense establishment: promote military engagement activities in peacetime; deterrence of aggression and prevention of conflict; and, fighting and winning our Nation's wars.

Changes in the international environment—both geopolitical and economic — since the end of the Cold War have demonstrated the value of our alliances in supporting our global interests. Recent events have made it clear that coordinated multinational pressure will be critical in deterring aggression and preventing conflict, and that coalitions will frequently be the means by which wars are fought and won. Therefore, supporting our allies, remaining engaged globally, and ensuring interoperability with likely coalition partners are the paths to serve the national interests of the United States. America must also sustain its domestic capabilities, ensuring an industrial base that can respond to national and international security needs.

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which was also intended to fulfill the strategic planning requirements of the Government Performance and Results Act, highlighted the importance of international programs in supporting multilevel engagement activities with potential coalition partners around the world. The QDR process defined a "Shape-Respond-Prepare" strategy for U.S. forces for the period 1997-2015. To shape the international environment, the QDR emphasized the importance of DOD and Navy International Programs central effort "such as defense cooperation, security assistance, International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs, and international arms cooperation" in accomplishing U.S. strategic objectives.

The major areas of responsibility in Navy International Programs are: security assistance, oversight of technology transfer, and cooperative programs. In recent years, we have seen a declining trend in the foreign military sales area of security assistance and a concomitant rise in export licensing — an indicator of direct commercial sales activity. Recognizing that trend, we will continue to support our foreign military sales responsibilities, but take a more proactive, innovative role in meeting the legitimate needs of those countries seeking defense articles and services. DON is proactively engaged in new teaming arrangements with industry to improve weapon system planning, actively

¹ *A National Security Strategy for A New Century*, May 1997.

² *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, September 1997.

³ *The Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review*, May 1997, Section III, p.3.

searching for new ways to combine FMS with direct commercial sales, and re-thinking how we view and promote our industrial partners with such programs as the Ship Export Initiative. This revised, inclusive acquisition strategy is reflected in the ASN(RD&A) *Strategic Plan* 1998-2003 that seeks to both improve and streamline the whole weapons system design and acquisition process, and partner with international stakeholders, allies and industry.⁴

The rapid advancement in modern technology has created not only capabilities, but also fiscal challenges for the United States and its allies. In order to sustain a national defense advantage over rogue states or potential adversaries, America and its friends cannot ignore the developments being offered by modern science. To share the cost burdens of complex new systems, the importance of cooperative development is increasing. Likewise, the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program represents a particularly important opportunity. With the new Foreign Military Sales Reserve Program in place, which maintains end items and secondary items for out-of-U.S. inventory weapons systems, EDA can be a proven bridge to current technology. For those states where complete systems of cutting edge technology is too expensive, too complex or just doesn't "fit", proven, documented, and, now, well supported systems offer guaranteed interoperability that may well prove decisive. EDA programs, leveraged this way, not only give countries budget maneuver room, but may be a relationship-building opportunity that leads to incremental capabilities improvements, future system upgrades or sales.

Our national industrial base and those of our allies are struggling to define the means by which not only domestic economic interests can be sustained but also national imperatives for cooperation can be served. Navy International Programs will seek ways to encourage and facilitate cooperative development, innovative programs and creative use of available FMS tools that balance the domestic and national interests of the United States and its allies.

⁴ *ASN(RD&A) Strategic Plan Revision 1998-2003 draft, June 1998.*

Requirements of the Theater Commanders-in-Chief

Our theater Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) have defined their objectives in supporting the national strategies within their respective Areas of Responsibility (AORs). The Department of the Navy's International Programs Office will work proactively to support those objectives. The sea services are tasked to respond to the requirements of the CINCs. However, recent years have seen a decline in Navy and Marine Corps resources to respond to all requirements levied. This trend is expected to continue for the remainder of this decade, and will **further** constrain the capabilities of the services to fulfill all the CINCs' needs. Navy International Programs linked to allied and friendly countries, and aligned with the **CINC's** goals, have the potential to augment the resources available to the CINCs and help alleviate the constraints felt by the sea services in responding to multiple requirements.

The Navy International Programs Community also supports the needs of the individual services. In an era of constrained defense budgets and emerging threats, our forces are charged with ensuring that American lives and interests are protected with the most effective resources available. Multiple, ambiguous threats around the globe complicate the ability of the military to perform day-to-day operations while simultaneously being prepared for conflict. Modern technology is needed to counter the proliferation of weapons of all kinds. However, that technology is not inexpensive.

International Cooperative Programs, as the Navy acknowledges in its *1997 Posture Statement*, help to "reduce naval technology and system modernization costs.... International Cooperation results in millions of research-and-development dollars from foreign nations." Foreign military sales not only aid in burdensharing, but likewise enhance and promote the interoperability gained from fielding common equipment, utilizing common logistics, and operating from common doctrine.

According to the *1997 Navy Operational Concept*, the Navy's role in peacetime engagement is to "project American influence abroad in support of U.S. efforts to shape the security environment in ways that promote regional economic and political stability... We execute peacetime engagement by staying constantly engaged abroad as a visible tool of U.S. foreign policy and by supporting U.S. coalition-building efforts."

United States Central Command (USCENTCOM)

Strategic Environment

USCENTCOM's strategic challenge centers on the fact that the United States has vital interests distant from its shores, but close to potential threats, in a volatile region where political and fiscal constraints limit the nature and scope of U.S. forward presence. Age-old animosities and potential regional aggressors threaten American allies as well. The region is home to a growing population, Islamic extremist unrest, and escalating tensions between Pakistan and India. The absence of formal agreements and treaties with friendly states in the region means U.S. access is gained through a series of bilateral executive agreements for military presence, prepositioning, status of forces, and security assistance.

USCINCCENT's Area of Interest (AOI) contains potential aggressors such as Iraq and Iran. At the same time, the region is home to many friends, including Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates. The countries of the Horn of Africa continue to experience humanitarian crises through famine and political instability. In South Asia, the unstable situations in Pakistan and Afghanistan are exacerbated by the long-standing and now openly nuclear animosity between India and Pakistan. In central Asia, former Soviet states are emerging from years of economic isolation and central, single party governments. These states represent both great promise and inherent institutional, economic, and infrastructure challenges. The region presents the constant threat of hostilities directed against U.S. allies and interests.

USCINCCENT's Theater Strategy

USCENTCOM has grouped his theater into four sub-regions in order to increase U.S. and command understanding of the theater, identify areas for mutual cooperation, and leverage engagement activities with key states whose influence extends between the following sub-regions?

- Arabian Peninsula
- Horn of Africa
- North Red Sea States
- South and Central Asia

It is the goal of U.S. Central Command to pursue the following theater end state:

“...a region at peace where there is unhindered access to strategic natural resources and an expansion of free markets.” “The spread of democracy, respect for human rights and economic growth have produced a level of stability that allows regional nations to resolve conflicts peacefully and to reduce potential for human suffering...”

USCENTCOM Theater Strategic Concept

⁵ *U.S. Central Command Theater Strategic Concept [TEP] 1999-2003: “A Strategy of Collective Engagement Through Balance, Integration, and Flexibility”* (draft), 1 May 1998, p. 27.

This arrangement facilitates maintaining the “balance” and “integration” of the CINC’s strategy while maintaining its “flexibility.” USCENTCOM’s Theater Engagement Strategy has evolved from the previous “Five Pillars” approach to one of “Collective Engagement.” This strategy strives to balance the requirements of forward presence, access, deterrence and engagement in one of the world’s most dynamic geo-political environments. In order to promote and protect U.S. interests across the possible spectrum of military operations, from major conflict to peacekeeping, USCENTCOM depends on strategic lift and power projection, forward presence and access, an ambitious combined exercise program, and focused Security Assistance. Specific goals to execute this strategy and Navy International Programs primary missions supporting those goals **are** shown in **Table 1.** ⁶

Table 1. USCENTCOM Theater Strategic Goals and Navy International Programs

USCENTCOM GOALS	SUPPORT TO CINC FROM IPO PRIMARY MISSIONS			Comments
	Cooperative Programs	Technology Transfer	Security Assistance	
Protect, promote, and preserve U.S. interests in the region to include access, freedom of navigation, and maintenance of regional stability		X	X	IMET, E-IMET, EDA, and other security assistance
Develop and maintain the forces and infrastructure needed to respond to the full spectrum of military operations		X	X	IMET, E-IMET, EDA, and other security assistance
Deter conflict through demonstrated resolve in such efforts as forward presence, prepositioning, exercises, and confidence building measures		X	X	IMET, E-IMET, EDA, and other security assistance to provide resources
Maintain command readiness to fight and win decisively at all levels of conflict			X	IMET, E-IMET, EDA, and other security assistance to provide resources
Protect the force by providing an appropriate level of security and safety			X	IMET, E-IMET, EDA, and other security assistance to provide security
Maintain, support, and contribute to coalitions and other collective security efforts that support U.S. and mutual interests in the region		X	X	Full range of mission options from IMET to FMS+ +
Promote and support responsible and capable regional militaries		X	X	Full range of mission options from IMET to FMS+ +
Promote efforts to counter threats from WMD, terrorism, information warfare, organized crime, and drug trafficking			X	IMET, E-IMET, EDA, and other security assistance to provide security
Establish and maintain close relationships with regional political and military leaders			X	IMET, E-IMET
Develop integrated regional engagement approaches through				Full range of mission options from IMET to

⁶ Ibid, pp. 15-23.

USCENTCOM GOALS	SUPPORT TO CINC FROM IPO PRIMARY MISSIONS			Comments
	Cooperative Programs	Technology Transfer	Security Assistance	
cooperation with counterparts in the interagency, other unified commands, and key organizations		X	X	FMS++ including coordinated CINC/ Navy IPO strategies
Promote and support environmental and humanitarian efforts and respond to humanitarian and environmental crisis			X	IMET, EDA, and other security assistance to provide resources
Educate key leaders on the USCENTCOM's mission			X	E-IMET
Maintain regional awareness of security, political, social, and economic trends			X	IMET, E-IMET, and other security assistance

Balance, Integration, and Flexibility

The enroute support structure provided at European strategic ports is vital to meet USCENTCOM's operational commitments. Agreements that strengthen or sustain this support structure assist USCENTCOM in its ability to project power when called upon by the National Command Authority. However, the access that remains the prerequisite for USCENTCOM's strategy is gained through a series of bilateral executive agreements for military presence, prepositioning, and security assistance. Prepositioning is described in the CINC's strategy as a "strategic imperative" and military construction to provide infrastructure is a key element supporting USCENTCOM prepositioning efforts. Security assistance programs help the Command retain essential bases and access rights and cultivate new opportunities. Gaining and maintaining access through military-to-military relationships is an ongoing USCENTCOM focus in its effort to deter conflict, limit conflict when deterrence fails, and providing mechanisms to prevail in combat when required.

The CINC's 1996 strategy document noted, that: "Reinforcing our forward presence in the Central Region are the more than 800 military personnel assigned to Security Assistance Organizations (SAOs), Technical Assistance Field Teams (TAFTs), and Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) stationed in the AOR" managing the multi-billion dollar security assistance programs in Egypt, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and other countries. Today, these teams are more important to U.S. forces' access and forward presence in the theater and USCENTCOM specifically recognizes the critical role of Security Assistance in the region. As U.S. and other nations have reduced their presence, in place SAOs, TAFTs, and MTTs represent a higher percentage of the U.S. force. Security assistance is a direct foreign policy instrument aiding U.S. access to the AOR.

Capable, interoperable equipment and effective training are important means to enhance the self-defense capabilities of U.S. security partners so that they can meet an increasingly larger share of their own defense requirements. The improved capabilities gained by U.S. partners improve the prospects for peace through deterrence, regional security, and cooperative defense arrangements. USCENTCOM seeks to "work with coalition partners and regional friends to improve their capabilities for self defense and combined operations through tailored security assistance programs."⁷

⁷ USCENTCOM Theater Strategic Concept, p. 19.

Many of the countries in USCENTCOM's region are enthusiastic users of the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and International Military Education and Training (IMET). Weapons transfers through sales and FMF enhance the interoperability that make coalitions function. The total system support offered by security assistance provides regional partners not only weapon system procurement, but also integration and training, and follow-on logistics support. Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates have purchased or acquired aircraft, ships and other military equipment through Security Assistance programs. Having completed most of their large end item purchases,⁸ these states will now likely focus on maintenance, logistic support and training programs.

IMET and E-IMET are invaluable programs in the region, yielding long-term results. Many regional political and military leaders have attended IMET courses. In Jordan, virtually every general officer has attended at least one American Professional Military Education (PME) course. Friendships established during these courses create a strong bond and often generate new opportunities for access. With the re-alignment and addition of new states within the USCENTCOM AOR, IMET opportunities will grow.⁹

The USCENTCOM staff (J4-7) has developed a security assistance plan to assess current security assistance activities, recommend priorities for future programs and advise on allocation of IMET funds. The plan's intent is to foster relationships through engagement while shaping coalition combat capability and address potential coalition force requirements. It focuses on areas in need of Command emphasis, helps to shape FMS and FMF, and recommends priorities for IMET funds. This plan may receive increasing emphasis concurrent with the increasing relative impact of security assistance programs as an engagement option. The annual USCENTCOM Security Assistance Conference's success further underscores this impact. The conference brings together representatives of all elements of the International Programs Community. Special emphasis has been placed on inclusion of U.S. industry representatives to help advance FMS opportunities within the competitive international market, thereby helping to support the U.S. defense industrial base.

Of the remaining DON International Programs mission areas addressed in this plan, the technology transfer evaluation function can contribute to USCENTCOM's strategy. A logical level of technology sharing can enhance our forward presence by providing our regional allies and partners with systems that assist in interoperability for both exercises and coalition warfare. Planning for increasingly capable coalition partners, able to provide for their own defense requirements as well as participate in coalition operations, is a USCENTCOM goal that is demonstrated and evaluated during exercises with our regional allies. Cooperative programs are not yet a viable technique in USCENTCOM's AOR.

Combined exercises provide an opportunity to observe the areas where we need to strengthen our ability to act in coalition, and to put in motion efforts to transfer technology to answer common problems. Exercise Related Construction and USCENTCOM's Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Program, which supports the exercise program, builds regional goodwill and is essential to the operation of crisis coalitions. The exercises are visible proof of U.S. commitment to the area. They also offer an opportunity to show regional friends the deterrent value of pre-positioned equipment, thereby strengthening the validity of U.S. requests for prepositioning opportunities within the theater.

⁸ Ibid, p. 34.

⁹ Ibid, p. 33-34.

The exercise programs are useful in enhancing regional interoperability as they have evolved from a bilateral exercise to trilateral and multilateral formats. USCENTCOM seeks to enhance multilateral and coalition opportunities with current and future AOR states such as with the Central Asian Battalion (CENTRASBAT) in FYOO and beyond and, in coordination with USEUCOM, the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and Partnership for Peace (PfP) activities.”

Planning for International Programs

The objectives that follow for Navy International Programs with USCENTCOM region nations are for a **one-to-five year timeframe**:

Cooperative Programs

- Cooperative Programs do not appear to be a very practical international program tool in this region.

Technology Transfer

- Examine the elements of Navy Theater Wide Air Defense System (NTW) to determine releasability to specific countries in the CENTCOM AOR.
- Develop a plan that identifies exportable technologies which support combined exercises and are legitimately required by individual countries in the region on a case-by-case basis.

Security Assistance Programs

- Institute a program that identifies potential Direct Commercial Sales (DCS), or combination FMS/DCS opportunities and targets those opportunities for the Enhanced FMS program.
- Continuation and expansion of ongoing programs for which the evolving relationship between USCENTCOM and regional nations present an opportunity to meet their legitimate defense requirements.
- Identify potential Excess Defense Articles (EDA) and ship transfer customers with an emphasis on non-traditional or infrastructure needs where appropriate. Pay particular attention to the emerging Central Asian States’ requirements.
- Provide life-of-program support for EDA through the FMS Reserve Program.
- Leverage those Security Assistance needs identified during combined exercises into system sales or transfer, as they become available and are releasable.
- Emphasize building indigenous Mine Counter Measure (MCM) capabilities in theater.

¹⁰ Ibid, p. 29.